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Abstrak
Riset ini ditujukan untuk mengetahui korelasi antara krisis moneter 1997 dengan proses konsolidasi demokrasi di Korea Selatan, terutama dalam
hubungan industrial. Sebagai komponen pelengkap industrialisasi; negara, bisnis dan buruh secara alami sering melakukan aksi konfliktual. Seperti di
banyak negara berkembang atau negara industri baru, Korea Selatan mengalami rezim negara perkembangan yang kuat dimana negara memiliki
hubungan yang sangat erat dengan kelompok usaha, sementara kebijakan tenaga kerja mereka sangat represif. Tapi saat krisis 1997 terjadi, tiga
pihak yang berkonflik dan bersaing sepertinya setuju dengan beberapa poin untuk menyelesaikan masalah yang timbul dari krisis. Karena itu proses
konsolidasi demokrasi menjadi lebih mudah.
Pertanyaan mengapa krisis terlihat mempercepat demokratisasi perlu dicermati. Penelitian dimulai dengan menggali penyebab dan dampak krisis
pada tiga pihak. Beberapa fakta menunjukkan krisis 1997 mempengaruhi semua sektor ekonomi, sosial dan politik pada bangsa, yang kemudian
menjadi ancaman bersama bangsa. Beberapa program pemulihan strategis dibentuk, beberapa kesepakatan ditandatangani, dan pada saat itu
konsolidasi demokrasi dikonfirmasi.
Kata Kunci: Demokratisasi, Krisis Moneter 1997, Korea Selatan
Abstract
The field research was set to find out the correlations between the 1997 monetary crisis and the process of democratic consolidation in South
Korea, especially in term of industrial relations. As complementary components of industrialization; state, business and labors are, by nature, often
performed conflicting actions. Like in many other developing countries or newly industrializing countries, South Korea experienced a strong
developmental state regime where state has a very tight relation with business group, while their labor policy was badly repressive. But as the 1997
crisis occurred, the three conflicting and competing parties seemed to agree to some points according to solve the problems affected by the crisis.
The process of democratic consolidation seems to be swifted because of it.
The question of why the crisis seems to swift the democratization needs to be observed by then. The research was started by exploring the cause
and impact of the crisis to the three parties. Some facts were found that the 1997 crisis affected all the economic, social and political sectors of
the nation, which by any means it became a common threat of the nation. Some strategic recovery programs were set up, some agreement were
signed up, and by then the democratic consolidation were being confirmed.
Keyword: Democratization, 1997 Monetary Crisis, South Korea
INTRODUCTION
As an effort in developing the mechanism of social-
political system, democratization can be observed
from many angle of approaches that are considered
relevant for an analysis. In this research, the term of
democratization after the 1997 crisis in South Korea is
a case-study about the relationship between govern-
ment, business and labor, or better known in Korean
as the no-sa-jung relations, in a comparison between the
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era before and after 1997 monetary crisis.
THE FORMULATION OF QUESTION
This research will set a comparison of some related
aspects in the process of democratization in the no-sa-
jung relationship that occured before and after the
crisis. The 1997 monetary crisis was reckoned as the
important time aspect since it was very critical mo-
mentum in Asian, especially in regards to its global
role. Since the early 1960’s, the country gained an
average 10% economic growth every year. This success
has been developed based on strong government
policies, called as a statist approach (etatism). Based
on the same approach, the state developed a economic
plan for national and sectoral business development,
which has also been run based on this policy.
There are at least 3 important elements supporting
the success of the economic development in South
Korea. The first is when president Park Chung-Hee, in
1996, introduced economic policy accentuating on
export than import substitution by maintaining the
level of foreign currency exchange values close to
virtual exchange value. Secondly, the level of saving
and investment (more than 30% GDP) during more
than 30 years was very helpful in assuring capital
reservation accumulation. Thirdly, educated and
highly motivated human resources were very impor-
tant for fast development.
Haggard and Moon (1990), categorized South
Korea’s political structure as a strong nation which
was predominated by top executives, bringing about a
mechanism of decision making that was separate from
social pressures.  Therefore, there are 4 (four) factors
that allowed South Korea to apply a statist approach:
(1) the existence of non-political institutions able to
intervene in private business; (2) the weakness of labor
groups; (3) anti-communism authoritarianism; and (4)
the existence of technocrats consciously developing
the industrial structure with the main objective of
creating economic independence (Lee,1997).
Like in other countries that had just started indus-
trialization, South Korea also faced the same labor
problems. There are three classical problems that
usually appear at the beginning of industrialization.
The first is the weakness of their organizational ability.
The second is no labor party or political party signifi-
cantly speaking about laborer’s interest. While the
third is, that ‘senior’ labors were not ready to compete
openly against  the “juniors” (Amsden, 1989:192-193).
Park’s very strict policies resulted him killed by his
own former head of intelligence (1979). The assassina-
tion triggered the reforms movement to take action,
especially by the students. Since the Kwangju tragedy,
where some 200 students were killed by the army,
later leading general Chun Doo Hwan to become the
fifth president of South Korea. Under Chun, the
political system became repressive. The policy of an
export economy had brought in the foreign invest-
ment guaranteed by the government, but those gaining
the benefits were the conglomerates (chaebol), while
labor groups remained in a weak position.
The second pattern was when the civil government
took over the government from the military regime, or
when Kim Young Sam replaced Roh Tae Woo (1992).
If the first pattern was said as state corporatism, that
was when the state “the master” of the industrializa-
tion process, while the labor groups became “slaves”.
Mutually beneficial traditions between the govern-
ment and businessmen in the military regime was
changed when Kim Young Sam, an opposition leader,
was elected as president. He at once announced that
he would never accept any political fundings from the
business sector. His two former presidents, Chun Doo
Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, were allegedly accused of
accepting bribery. On the 17 April 1997, Chun was
sentenced to life and Roh received a 17 year sentence.
The state’s economic policy that has rolled for so
long resulted in moral decadency in international as
well as national level. In the 1960’s and 1970’s
president Park’s regime always provided international
loan guarantees more for the shake of big South
Korean corporations. Since 1990, the government had
no longer provided any guarantees for the same loans,
although the international investor still had an expec-
tation that the government would do the same thing
in the future.
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The nation started showing symptoms of economic
downturn in 1996. Industrial product growth de-
creased from 14% per year in 1995 to 10% in 1996.
The growth level  in the manufacturing sector selling
also decreased from 20% per year in 1995  to 10%  in
1996 (Smith in McLeod and Garnaut, 1990). 27%
out of 30 noted conglomerates experienced debt-
guarantee ratio more than 300% at the end of 1996,
and some 14 other conglomerates even experienced
the ratio more than 500%. The stock value in stock
exchange decreased up to 35%. At least 50.000
workers in the sector were laid off in 1996. The
foreign debt went up from $102 billion at the end of
1996, and $110 billion in October 1997, while the
short-term debt percentage increased up to 59% in a
year. In the end, the total deficit was $23.1 billion in
1996, which was 4.8% of GNP.
To make its better economic performance, South
Korean government made an effort to change its
national economic structure through regulation
reformation in the parliament. The first was the law of
labors, which was presented to the parliament in 1996
that wanted to erase long life labor by offering the
possibility of having layoffs. This was aimed to get a
better level of competition of South Korean corpora-
tion (at international level) through a free labor
market.
The second is the law draft on finance proposed in
august 1997. This was the government effort to
consolidate the control of trade and commercial banks
in order to improve the autonomy of the central bank
of Korea. Like the labor’s law drafts, this draft re-
mained in the parliament desk until the crisis at-
tacked.
In the further development, Kim Dae Jung who
was elected a president in early 1998 conducted a
brave economic and political policy. The economic
development increased up to 10,7% (the previous year
was only 5,8%). the GNP was lifted up with the
amount of $1.839 in comparison to the previous year
(in 1998 it was only $6.742 becoming $8.581, increas-
ing 2 points at 37th world’s best rank, previously at
39th rank) (Korean Annual 2000).
A polling conducted by monthly Newsmagazine Win
to give score on Kim Dae Jung’s first year work
showed that 87,7 percent of the respondents assumed
that Kim’s solution to handle the economic crisis was
very successful, and also the foreign support to his
government was scored very satisfying (54.4% respon-
dents). Even 82,1% respondents believed that the
presidential departments under Kim Dae Jung was
considered very good at solving the problems faced by
Korea at the time (Jong-joo,1999).
From the above description, this research will be
developed based on the main questions: why did crisis
seem to swift the process of democratic consolidation among
the relations of government-business-labor in South Korea?
RESEARCH METHOD
This research is developed based on a library
research including the content analysis of mass media
and completed with a field research by using interview
technique by conducting an era comparison on the
efforts of democratization that had been done by
government-businessmen-and labor before and after
the crisis.
The field research conducted in July and august
2003 in Seoul and several industrial cities were
sponsored by AUN-KASEAS, the Asian University
Network with South East Asian study department
located in South Korea.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The discussion on democratization is basically a
discourse on citizen or people’s relations with the
state. For such relations, there are some approaches
can be applied to describe it. 1997 economic crisis as
the intervening variable of the research will be analyzed
at the beginning, in order to be understood as the
trigger of the democratization process which had been
running before and after the crisis. To present more
supporting points of the evidence considered unique,
the concept of societal-corporatism will also be
applied.
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RESULT AND ANALYSIS
CRISIS AND THE DAILY POLITICS
The perception on crisis always brings about the
agenda for the government to make a new policy.
There is a theoretical consensus that crisis gives a larger
autonomy for the elites of the decision makers to
make the options, and the pressures they face encour-
age them to make the very determining decisions.
Empirically, some evidences can be seen that crisis
and the emergence of reformation are the two things
that are related to each other (Grindle and Tho-
mas,1991:83). Crisis is always signaled by the increase
of people’s demand, big risks, more focused attention
to only certain things.
The rational actor model assumes that the concept
on uncertainty and the risk to explain that a reform
has to be understood as an effort to ‘satisfy’ and gain
‘profit’. In bureaucratic politics, daily routines and the
decision makers are very predominant until the crisis
encouraged the decision makers to act carefully
towards the position, power, and influence in the
abnormal situation. Each model predicts that the
reform will not succeed until a crisis came to happen
(Grindle and Thomas,1991:83).
DEMOCRACY TRANSITIONS
There are three sources of political values as the
procedural component in achieving political develop-
ment, which are considered suitable with what was
said by Di Palma dealing with the transitional condi-
tion in democratic political development. To
Guisseppe Di Palma, building democracy is like
creating an artwork. Democratic citizen can be formed
or engineered by the actors of politics in a certain
condition. It works by applying some strategies, for
example by making joint agreement among the actors
to avoid the destructive actions (coup de tat, or
violations), or making agreements that are required to
settle down the conflicts, making any negotiations and
other democratic rules (Di Palma,1990:140).
When the phase of establishing agreement could be
passed through, then it would be necessary to have
consolidation by strengthening what they have
achieved. This kind of process, at a certain period of
development, is believed to be able to make strong
democratic political institution, so the conflicts in
society can be managed institutionally (Di
Palma,1990:112;140). Huntington, in more details,
presented 4 (four) transition patterns; (1) transforma-
tion pattern, when the government elites take the
initiatives to lead the democratization effort, like in
Spain after General Franco; (2) replacement pattern,
that is when the opposing group lead the movement
toward democratization, like in Argentina (against
Peron) east Germany or Portugal; (3) “trans-placement”
pattern, when democratization started passing through
the process of  “bargaining” between the government
and the opposition, like what happened in Poland,
Nicaragua and Bolivia, and (4) through the “interven-
tion” pattern  when the process of democratization is
formed and forced by external actors like what hap-
pened in Grenada, Panama or Japan after the world
war II (Huntington, 1991).
What happened during the period of mid 1970’s
and 1990’s, there were 35 (thirty five) cases of democ-
ratization which 16 (sixteen) appeared through trans-
formation, 11 (eleven) through trans-placement, 6 (six)
through replacement and the other 2 through inter-
vention. It showed that more than one third of the
cases of democratization appeared through negotiation
(consensus) between the government elites and the
opposition group (Mas’oed, 1994:20-21). When
Huntington wrote it; South Korea’s case has not
appeared yet. It seemed that the reconciliation done
by Kim Dae Jung was categorized as trans-placement,
that is, by giving amnesty to the two former presidents
who were prisoners, improving small-middle business
(Huntington, 1991:113). But, it could also be classi-
fied as the “intervention” model, according to the role
of IMF and the foreign banking in the country’s
economic recovery. Seen from the procedure towards
democracy, Kim Dae Jung choice could be categorized
as the democracy consolidation.
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DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND THE POLITICAL
LEARNING
The characteristics of the democratic consolidation
is identified by the effort of establishing agreement of
new role plays. Nurton, Guther and Higley (1992)
assume that the democratic consolidation is a rule
which integrates all procedural criteria of democracy
and is also a state where the main political groups are
willing to accept the existing political institutions and
support the democratic regulations. Valenzuela also
states that democratic consolidation requires proce-
dural consensus to erase institutional deviations from
democracy (Mainwaring, 1993).
One of the main characteristics of the existence of
democratic consolidation is the transition period,
which is the significant change on political and social
institution. Even Vanezuela describes that transition
symptoms encourage the consolidation (Mainwaring,
1993). It can be said that transition is the main factor
for the consolidation continuation. Some other
factors considered to support are; a certain historical
experience, solutions of political conflicts, social
conflict management, and the loosing of military role.
In addition, it is necessary to note that the democracy
consolidation can be conducted due to the agreement
and cooperation of the elites. The role of public
opinion is also the determining factor for the demo-
cratic consolidation to run (Higley and Gunter, 1992).
MARKET
Market as the information mediator will strengthen
the credibility of each side of the industrial relations.
If the job market was too tight because the labor’s
organization was strong, for instance, the market
would indicate the negative influence. If the effect
were too bad, the public support to the labor’s
struggle would decrease. The market would restrict the
bargaining area. If the labor’s demand was more than
what was offered by the market, they would lose their
credibility.
The increase pattern of labor wage showed high-rise
since 1987. The level of nominal wage raise motivated
the productivity consistently in that year. The wage
raise was increasing higher for the next 5 years until
1992. The ratio of wage payment and GNP increased
since 1987 convincingly, and in 1992 the comparison
reached 61% of 51,2% in 1986. As a comparison, the
ratio was only around 50% in 1980 – 1986.
The economic condition during democracy era also
supported the wage raise. The job market was very
tight in 1987; unemployment (in non-agricultural
sector) decreased until 3,8% of average 4,9 in the last
three years, and continued decreasing until 3,1%.
However, the real wage raise was higher in 1988-1989
than in 1991-1992, even though the number unem-
ployment was higher at the same period. The high
demand of labor force in 1991-1992 was caused by
Table 1: Strike Activity and Wage
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construction sector of housing program declared by
President Roh Tae Woo.
Later, the competitiveness, decrease caused by the
wage increase influenced the labor expectation in two
things: First, labor activities, especially with violence
and legal violation that would decrease public sup-
port. Second, labor’s group would give concession to
the labor standard that they fought for.
LEGAL INSTITUTION
The court was a political source, which was imple-
mented through their decision in some important
cases. The Supreme Court announced that the prohi-
bition for the third side to interfere (in labor disputes)
had been enacted in January 1990, and so had the
government rejection toward a teacher union in 1992.
In having negotiation on labor’s act, the court
actions always based on the legal’s interest and it
seemed that the public supported it. When the legal
institution broke its support to the labor’s demand,
the public would spontaneously put their position in
the labor’s interest, and thus they strengthened the
labor’s bargaining position.
In certain cases, the rule made by the court in
facing labors in illegal negotiation was badly needed to
make the labors fulfill democracy procedure. Initially,
they were objected with the term of illegal negotia-
tion. KTUC said that between March 1988 until
April 1992 there were 24,6% labors who were ar-
rested based on Labor Dispute Adjustment Act -
LDAA, 15% of them had something to do with a
company act, 35,1% violence violation, 18,9%
violation in court room and demonstration, 7,6%
inhibited the officers’ examination and 15% violation
to security act. Sometimes, in guilty labors were also
in jailed while the government was never taken into
account.
In 1991, when the labors went strike as their
protest to some of their leaders, the supreme court
decided that those activities was not included as labor
negotiation. Thus, it was regarded as legal violation
and their activities impeded the company. This
Supreme Court decision motivated the government to
put LDAA into effect and forced the labors to obey it.
The court sometimes also became the labors’ side if
they were involved with the only representative of
labor union, and also the prohibition of strike right
for government officers. In March 1993, the Act
judicature found constitutional inconsistency in
section 12 (2) which stated that LDAA prohibited the
government officer to do mass action/activities. The
Supreme Court also challenged to some legal action
pressure done by the government. In April 1992, the
Supreme Court legislated that remuneration must be
paid when a strike happened, and it weakened the
government policy on “no work no pay”.
The court decision varied and did not take only
one side. Sometimes the court might take sides on the
employers or the government in some legal violation,
and another occasion it took sides on the labor in the
case of the sole labor union. This policy would
motivate other sides to behave fairly.
THE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE
The international pressure functioned in other
thing. The activity done by labor’s group in more
successful countries became the main references for the
labor’s group. In the industrial relations, the interna-
tional standard that prevailed in International Labor
Organization (ILO) got legitimacy, so any side that
supported this standard would get public support.
Since 1993 the International Labor Organization
(ILO) warned about the importance of Labor Act
Reform that was in line with ILO standard and the
principle of organization freedom. The labor act which
was strongly criticized by ILO was about: a sole union,
the involvement of the third side (in a labor dispute)
and the prohibition to unite for government workers
and teachers.
Those international pressures were stronger in 1996
when South Korea tried to join organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD.
This International institution required the changes of
South Korean Labor Act in order to be appropriate
with the international standard.
If the labors got public support, the employers
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would lose it. If the labors decided to continue their
activities by having public support in their side, the
possibility of employers to survive was small or in
other word the employers finally would compromise.
The political learning theory showed that the labors
and employers would have an agreement if the politi-
cal learning had fulfilled a certain requirement for
both sides. The problem that appeared was not about
whether they would have an agreement in the future,
but it was about how and how fast they could com-
promise.
RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL
The problem of a decision-making was about how
the decision makers gathered the information, consid-
ered some possible actions and then choose based on
the most potential preferences (Allison, 1971;
Frohock, 1979). Previously, the rational actor model
were established from a classical economy theory by
which each actor was regarded capable to estimate all
possibilities based on complete information, and then
arrange the priority scale based on the most optimum
ways in order to reach a certain goal.
Some decision-making theories were then devel-
oped by the following concepts: bounded rationality,
satisfying, and incremen-talism (March, 1978). These
additional concepts thought that: since the perfect
rational choices were complex while the available time
and attention were limited, the decision makers (either
individually or organizationally) usually could not
reach an optimal solution of a case. They only got
“satisfaction” based on a certain criterion.
Incrementalism explained that the decision maker
tried to decrease uncertainty, the possibility of conflict
and complexity by restricting the changes from time to
time (Braybrook and Lindblom,1963). The more
uncertainty there was, the more perfect strategy was
needed.
SOCIETAL CORPORATISM
The interest representative system in South Korea
has moved from state corporatism to pluralism in the
transition of democracy. Under the pluralistic repre-
sentative system, many interest groups that strengthen
the civil society, hegemonic consolidation of the
capitalistic class and labor developed both quantitative
and qualitative records.
According to Katzenstein, societal corporatism
(democratic corporatism) in managing the interest
group has positive roles in creating political stability
and economic flexibility as well (Kanzenstein, 1985).
This happens because the concepts protect the balance
of the interest group and the economic classes from
any conflicts and always find conflict solutions
through interest groups representatives from all sectors
of the society to the structure of the government
decision-making (Schmitter in Pike and Strich, 1974).
Different from the pluralism, societal corporatism
stressed out that the state proactively forms and
develops the interests intermediary system and respon-
sible to its results.
According to Schmitter (in Pike and Strich,
1974:107), both pluralism and corporatism give some
basic assumptions. Both of them realize, accept and
try to handle the development of the structural
difference and the various interests of the modern
political society. But, both of them offer contradictive
solutions.
So, societal corporatism is the combination of the
pluralism with the state roles autonomously in politic.
In short, the main characteristics of the societal
corporatism are as follows: (1) the increasing quantity
and quality of labor associations, (2) the existence of
political organizations or parties that support labor
sector’s interest, (3) conducive social and cultural
environment to manage conflicts, fuse, concessions
and compromises, (4) labor-businessmen relationship
as a strong organization with a collective vote right,
and (5) government as mediator.
Since 1987, South Korean democratize the politi-
cal, social, and economic matters. State corporatism as
a means to handle interest conflict done by the
previous regime became pluralism or societal
corporatism. South Korea had done the social agree-
ment twice. The first was through the President
Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIRR)
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that was established in the era of Kim Young Sam’s
government. The second was the Tripartite Commis-
sion under Kim Dae Jung administration.
PCIRR did not result in significant things because
of the pluralistic limitations to the state while the
Tripartite Commission had positive roles in the
process of economic structure adaptations. PCIRR
was firstly established as a trial to the social agreement
for the social consultancy of the South Korean people.
Even Kim Young Sam government that was pro-
capitalistic had made the social consultancy among the
three parties difficult. The government’s role to
support the social agreement process was very weak.
On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung’s government’s
attitude towards those pro-labors could support the
labors’ participation in decision-making process on the
social agreement. When Kim Dae Jung’s government
actively involved itself in tripartite commission the
interest intermediation situation was soon formed as
expected in societal cooperatism (Lee and Lee,2000).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above notions, temporary conclusion
indicates that 1997 economic crisis has strengthened the
democratic consolidation on government-business-labor
relations in South Korea, since crisis introduced some political
learnings to the government, business and labors to conform
the procedures of democratic consolidation as their main way
to survive from crisis.
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